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w ORK.MEN'S COMPENSATION - INJURY OR DEATH DUE TO EXISTING
DISEASE AGGRAVATED BY ORDINARY WORK. - An employee who suffered
from high blood pressure and hardening of the arteries was employed by defendant. After helping another workman unload six hundred sacks of cement
weighing ninety-four pounds each in about forty minutes, the employee
became ill and suffered a stroke which permanently paralyzed his left limbs.
Held, compensation allowed under the Workmen's Compensation Act in spite
of the fact that the employee was doing normal work of his employment in
the usual way, and that he was at the time in an abnormal physical condition.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S. E. (2d)
84 (1940).

The Georgia court follows the decisions of the House of Lords,1 which give
a broad interpretation to the term "injury by accident" in the Workmen's
Compensation Statute,2 an interpretation that adheres to the popular meaning
of that term. 8 The English court justifies its holding on the ground that in ordinary parlance one who falls ill from a heart attack would be spoken of as

Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443; Clover v. Hughes, [1910] A. C. 242.
"If in any employment to which the Act applies personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to a workman, his employer
is, subject to the conditions referred to below, liable to pay compensation in accordance
with the provisions of the Act.••." 34 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, 2d ed., 801,
"Workmen's Compensation," § 1136 (1940).
8 Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443 at 448: "The truth is that in the Act,
which does not seem to have had the benefit of careful revision, 'accident' and 'injury'
-that is, injury by accident-appear to be used as convertible terms. . • . I come,
therefore, to the conclusion that the expression 'accident' is used in the popular and
ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event
· which is not expected or designed."
1

2
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having had an accident, and since Parliament passed the Workmen's Compensation Acts in order to confer an advantage on the employee, that body would
not have intended to leave out some injuries popularly considered to be accidents.4 According to the English doctrine it is immaterial that the employee
is pursuing his usual work in the usual manner, and there need be shown no
sudden strain or external accident. 5 Most American courts with statutes similar
to that in England 6 and in Georgia 7 are in accord with the result of the principal case.8 But some American courts refuse to take such a broad view of
"injury by accident," and hold that there must be either some external happening or an unusual strain or circumstance which causes the injury. 0 The
Arizona courts refuse to grant compensation in similar cases on the ground
that in the phrase "injury by accident" the preposition "by'' requires that the
"accident" must be the cause of the injury.10 The Michigan court also refuses
to accept the English doctrine in so far as it would allow compensation where
the injury occurred while the employee was doing his usual work in the usual
manner.11 The Michigan court does, however, agree that the word "accident"
is used in its popular sense and means an unlooked-for mishap, or an untoward
event which is not expected or designed.12 Missouri decisions may be distinguished, as was done in the principal case, on the basis of the definition given
"injury by accident" in the statute of that state.18 However, the Washington
Id. at 446, 447.
Partridge Jones & John Paton, Ltd. v. James, [1933] A. C. 501; McFarlane
v. Hutton Bros., 136 L. T. 547, 96 L. "J. (K. B.) 357 (1926); Whittle v. Ebbw
Vale, Steele, Iron & Coal Co., (1936] 2 All E. R. 1221; Falmouth Docks & Engineering Co. v. Treloar, [1933] A. C. 481; Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. v. Walkenshaw, 28
B. W. C. C. 230 (1935).
6 Supra, note 2.
7 " 'Injury' and 'personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a disease in any form
except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident••••" Ga. Code
Ann. (1937), § n4-102.
8 19 A. L. R. IIO (1922); 28 A. L. R. 204 at 209 (1924); 60 A. L. R. 1299 at
1314 (1929).
9 Stombaugh v. Peerless Wire Fence Co., 198 Mich. 445, 164 N. W. 537 (1917);
Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P. (2d) 1017 (1933); Orlando v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 133 Pa. Super. 588, 3 A. (2d) 220 (1938); Martin v. State
Compensation Comi:nr., 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S. E. 824 (1929). See l SCHNEIDER,
WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION, 2d ed., § 197, pp. 592-598 (1932), and supplements.
10 Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P. (2d) 1017 (1933).
11 Sinkiewicz v. Lee & Cady, 254 Mich. 218, 236 N. W. 784 (1931); Stombaugh v. Peerless Wire Fence Co., 198 Mich. 445, 164 N. W. 537 (1917).
12 Schroetke v. Jackson-Church Co., 193 Mich. 616, 160 N. W. 383 (1916).
The court allowed compensation where deceased, suffering from heart disease, received
nervous shock from the excitement attending the breaking out of a fire on his employer's property, and died as a result thereof.
18 '_'The word 'accident' • • • shall • • • be construed to mean an unexpected or
unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and
producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. The term 'injury' and 'personal injuries' shall mean only violence to the physical structure of the body and such
disease or infection as naturally results therefrom." Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), § 3305 (b).
4
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Supreme Court does allow compensation under a statute which appears even
less favorable to the employee than that in Missouri.14 One of the difficulties
in the aggravation of disease cases is in proving the causal connection between
the employee's work and the accident. This requirement needs to be satisfied
because the accident must arise out of and in the course of employment.15 In
order that compensation might be allowed in the aggravation of disease cases,
courts have had to minimize the importance of "injury by accident." By so
doing they are not giving a strictly logical interpretation to that phrase, but are
instead apparently trying to carry out the broad policy of the statute, i.e., to shift
the burden of all accidents incident to industry onto the employer who in turn
places it upon the consumer.
14
Bergagna v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 199 Wash. 263, 91 P. (2d) 551
(1939). Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932), § 7675, provides: "The word 'injury'
as used in this act means a sudden and tangible happening, of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and occurring from without, and such physical
condition as results therefrom."
15 In those English cases where compensation has been denied there has been no
evidence of causal relation between the employment and the injury. Davies v. Vipond
& Co., 146 L. T. 498 (1932); Ormond v. Holmes & Co., 53 T. L. R. 779, 157
L. T. 56, 107 L. J. (K. B.) 21 (1937); Mitchell v. T. W. Palmer & Co., 27 B. W.
C. C. 159 (1934). American courts have taken a broad view of this limitation, and
tend to allow compensation wherever liberal construction of the statute would justify
it. l ScHNEIDER, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION, 2d ed., § 262, pp. 734-745 (1932).

